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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

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and decisions by the Federal Power Commission.

I feel, as I am sure many do who are familiar with the oil and gas industry, that the FPC has gone far astray. Its decisions have not only placed unworkable hardships upon a vital industry but, in fact, have added to the ultimate cost to the consumer.

On May 12, the Wall Street Journal's editorial criticized one of the Commission's recent decisions. I believe the criticism is constructive, and in my opinion, certainly merited, and I draw my colleagues' attention to it at the end of my statement.

In addition, I would like to cite the House statements made in a recent communication to me by a constituent familiar with the petroleum industry and the FPC, who is critical of the 1963 annual report submitted to Congress by the FPC:

In this report it is stated that "the Commission has put into effect a workable plan" for regulating producers of natural gas. It further states that during the year it has made considerable progress and solid gains in producer regulation. Thus, the report seeks to create the impression that all is well with respect to producer regulation. The facts show to the contrary.

For 10 years, since the Supreme Court Phillips' decision in 1954, the FPC has been experimenting with producer regulations. Utility-type regulation was abandoned as unworkable after 6 years. For the past 3 years, the FPC has been experimenting with the area price method involving 23 separate areas. The first area proceeding is still underway, being far from final determination and even then subject to question as having no legal basis. The record therein shows that in groping for a solution, the Commission is resorting to absurd schemes and theories of regulation.

This 10-year experiment by the FPC has involved a tremendous waste of public funds, unnecessary costs to the industry, and higher prices to the consumers of natural gas. I believe this situation warrants investigation by the Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I agree that it is time Congress took a close look at the operation of this regulatory agency, and respectfully draw the attention of my colleagues to this communication and the recent editorial which follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1964]

## THE RAVENOUS REGULATORS

Though the reason for Federal regulation of business supposedly is protection of the public interest, it often seems that the regulators must have something quite different in mind.

This certainly appears to have been the case the other day in a decision handed down by the Federal Power Commission. Not content with its price-fixing power in natural gas, the FPC is moving farther toward wiping out free competition in the industry.

The decision involved United Gas Pipe Line Co., which had been buying gas from Continental Oil Co. under a 10-year contract. Shortly before the contract was scheduled to expire, Continental notified United that it would not be renewed.

Instead, Continental demanded that United sign a new 20-year contract—at a 45-percent increase in price. United said, No thanks, and began buying elsewhere the gas that it distributes to several areas of the country.

But United reckoned without the FPC. First, the agency approved Continental's price increase. Then, astonishingly, it or-

dered United to resume buying gas from Continental at the new, higher price.

How did the Commission acquire such arbitrary authority? Well, according to a majority of the Commissioners, the facilities through which United had been getting gas from Continental had been "dedicated" to public use; the public eventually got the gas that flowed through them. So, said the majority, United could not stop using these public facilities without an FPC OK.

The majority was unmoved by the fact that United's switch of suppliers had not cut its delivery of gas to consumers. Nor was it influenced by the view of a dissenting Commissioner that the ruling surely would raise the average price of gas. What apparently mattered most was that the FPC now was not only rigging prices but dictating what, in most areas, would be routine business decisions.

It's hard to see how this ruling serves the public interest. But perhaps protecting the public becomes boring when regulators develop an overwhelming hunger for power.

committee report issued in the autumn of 1963 revealed that up to mid-1962—more than a year before—Dean Rusk had personally waived security checks for 150 new key State Department employees, most of them over the violent objections of State's Security Office. In fact, many others had been personally cleared by Rusk and were working in the State Department without the Security Office's even knowing about them.

After the State security office had refused clearance to Cleveland, the security division was reorganized, reportedly along the lines planned by William Wieland, "ex-president of the Fidel Castro Fan Club."

The first reorganization move of the Kennedy administration was to abolish the jobs of 23 of State's professional agents. They were given 30 days to show cause why their jobs should not be abolished. Other security men were given minor and meaningless jobs calculated to make them resign. Many key security professionals, who had memorized dozens of security files and who could be "troublesome" if they were accorded too much of "the treatment," were sent abroad to meaningless jobs. Some of these were given foreign assignments on security, which were so laughable, they could be compared to giving J. Edgar Hoover a job as a traffic cop.

One top security official who received a show cause notice was Otto Otepka, chief of all personnel security, whose "security risk" findings at State skyrocketed into headlines across the Nation in the summer and autumn of 1963, when Otepka revealed to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee that Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland was trying to worm Alger Hiss and a number of other known security and loyalty risks back into the State Department. Otepka told the Senate subcommittee a lot more about the hanky-panky at State, too.

Otepka was no mere cog in the wheel in the State Department's security setup. He was the top man, the ranking Deputy Director of the Security Office, and was in charge of the entire personnel security organization of the U.S. State Department, both in Washington and in American embassies and consulates throughout the world.

Otepka was a hard-nosed security boss and, until the advent of the Kennedy administration, his security office of the State Department had been one of the most highly professional organizations in the Federal Government. It was Otepka's security organization, for instance, which—only a short time before Otepka received his pink slip from the Kennedy reorganizers—had fingered Foreign Service Officer Irving Scarbeck, who was subsequently convicted and imprisoned for giving American secrets to a female Soviet Polish spy in Warsaw. The Communist Mata Hari revealed in a U.S. court that the Soviet espionage apparatus had forced her to become Scarbeck's mistress in order to wean American secrets from him.

Otepka was absolutely nonpolitical, and had been drafted into the State Department in 1953 from the Civil Service Commission because he was regarded in Government circles as one of the finest, most dispassionate and most objective appraisers of personnel records in Federal career service. In the Federal Government since 1936, Otepka has the ability to realize that many people may have at least one skeleton in their family closets, but never to let this by itself disqualify an applicant for service, recognizing that in some cases, one can tell a workman by his chips. In fact, in 1958, Otepka was given the State Department's Meritorious Service Award for his outstanding work.

As chief of personnel security, it was Otepka's duty to investigate State Department mistakes about hailing Castro as a Robin Hood and letting Fidel establish a Communist bastion and a staging area for communizing all of Latin America, 90 miles

## Kluckhohn Book Cites Otepka Case

SPEECH  
OF

HON. JOHN M. ASHBROOK

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 7, 1964

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, Frank Kluckhohn has written two new books, "The Inside on L.B.J." and "Lyndon's Legacy." They are just off the press. In the latter book, chapter 5 is devoted to the infamous Otepka case which has been one of the storm signals on the path of the New Frontier which should alert all Americans to the appeasing policies of the State Department and their appalling lack of proper security measures. Mr. Kluckhohn has done an excellent job on this part of "Lyndon's Legacy" and I include that chapter with these remarks:

"LYNDON'S LEGACY," CHAPTER 5—AN END TO SECURITY—THE OTEPKA CASE

"For on his choice depends the safety and the health of the whole state." Shakespeare, "Hamlet"—I, iii, 17.

It was a foregone conclusion that with Adam Yarmolinsky—the great critic of Federal security against loyalty and security risks—actually in the Kennedy-Johnson inner circle, there would take place an effective smashing of security procedures in sensitive Federal departments and agencies. The effective smashing of the Security Office of the State Department might well be called Adam Yarmolinsky's "51st case."

The last hurrah for the State Department's security setup came immediately after the advent of the Kennedy administration, when the State Security Office ruled that now Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland should not be given even a temporary security clearance, and this ruling was upheld by the State Department's Acting Administrator of Security.

However, Secretary of State Dean Rusk personally waived security requirements for Cleveland. Rusk revealed this in a letter he wrote to a Congressman, and claimed that his personal clearance of Cleveland was "based on FBI reports"; but if this is so, the State Department's professional security officers certainly had drawn quite different conclusions from Rusk's.

Indeed, a Senate Internal Security Sub-

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from American shores. Of course this involved investigating William Wieland, who had been Chief of State's Office of Middle-American Affairs during the Eisenhower administration and who is a carryover onto the New Frontier. Otepka did a thorough investigation of Wieland and wrote a sizzling report on him, which has never been published; but it is known that Otepka said Wieland definitely should be dismissed.

Wieland had not been fired by the administration; in fact, the President was pleased with Mr. Wieland. This was brought to national attention at Kennedy's January 24, 1963, press conference when he informed the Nation that he had personally cleared Wieland for security (making it clear that he had acted on Dean Rusk's advice) and asserted that Wieland could perform his duties "without detriment to the interests of the United States."

Indeed, far from being dismissed, Wieland was, in fact, the senior officer (with two others, one of whom was reportedly J. Clayton Miller) who reportedly planned the Kennedy administration's "reorganization" of the State Department's security setup. Naturally, the State Department has denied that Wieland even had a hand in helping to smash State's security organization. Even putting aside Wieland's hideous pro-Communist record, it was a case of a man under investigation as a loyalty and security risk firing his chief investigator, Otto Otepka.

As soon as the State security office had been effectively smashed, the Foreign Service officer in charge, William Boswell, was one of those transferred overseas.

What security against loyalty and security risks now remains in the State Department? Even those few experts still in State's security office are so subjected to pressures from the top that there is no longer any effective security there. Actually, the New Frontiersmen and the Foreign Service are still policed, except that they now police themselves—politically, but certainly not for security and loyalty, most observers declare.

Self-policing of "security" is now standard procedure throughout much of the Federal Government under the Johnson administration. This chapter on State Department security is written only to give the public an idea of the situation throughout Washington and at our Government posts overseas.

This self-policing of security procedures extends even to our supersecret Government agencies which handle atomic and military secrets, as could be seen in the autumn of 1963, when two traitors were tabbed by the FBI for feeding top-secret Strategic Air Command (SAC) secrets to a ring of Soviet spies. Both men, John Butenko and Jack Conklin (Conklin died mysteriously in an auto crash before arrest) worked for International Electric Corp. on highly secret Air Force contracts and had been cleared by the Air Force Office of Special Investigation, which explained, "It is up to the individual plant to determine what type of clearance is required for an employee. The plant itself can give a lower clearance classification."

When the case broke it was discovered that Butenko, who held a top-secret security clearance, had Russian parents, a police record, and had been fired from the Navy in the middle of World War II on a medical discharge "because of constitutional traits which rendered him unfit for naval service." Conklin, who had a secret security clearance, had also been strangely discharged from the service in the middle of World War II, had a police record for cruelty to his child, was a habitual drunk, had been married five times, had beaten his fourth wife, and wife No. 5 never knew about wife No. 4.

The New York Journal-American's reporting of the case declared: "Is the Nation's internal security being jeopardized by inadequate screening of persons working on 'classi-

fied' Government defense contracts?" The answer is "Yes."

What happened to Otto Otepka is an excellent example of what now happens to anyone working for the Federal Government during the Johnson administration who raises questions about loyalty or security, or who knows too much.

During Otepka's decade of service as a State Department top security official, he had appraised the file of every State Department employee. Otepka was a highly competent professional security agent, as seen by his sleuthing and breaking of the Irving Scarbeck case. In some cases Otepka refused, after careful and impartial investigation, to clear State Department employees, among them Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland.

Otepka obviously was a danger to the administration, because of his detailed knowledge and prodigious memory of the pro-Communist records and activities of New Frontier appointees, as well as other appointees' "defects" in character. So Otepka was to be ditched, along with the 23 other State security officers. However, such a howl was raised in Congress that Otepka was retained, but the New Frontiersmen officially abolished his job and he was demoted to the relatively minor job of evaluating security files. A concerted effort was then made to get rid of Otepka, and finally, when he had adamantly refused to resign, State Department VIP's tried to shunt him off to the National War College in May 1962. He refused to go, recognizing the move as another step in the plan to get rid of him.

In October 1963, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee held hearings to investigate William Wieland, and subpoenaed Otto Otepka for testimony; and what Otepka told the Senators blew the whistle on Wieland. Otepka also told the Senators that in the adverse report he had written on Wieland after his investigation, he had specified and documented "serious questions of the man's integrity," and had urged that Wieland's case "should be reviewed and adjudicated under the Foreign Service regulations of the Department of the State."

Early in 1963, as part of the Senate subcommittee's continuing interest in Wieland and in other controversial State Department security cases, the subcommittee scheduled hearings to delve into additional State Department cases. Otepka was subpoenaed to testify in secret session.

Otepka testified for 6 days—and what he told the Senators nearly blew the ceiling out of the hearing room, with what one Senator on the subcommittee termed "political dynamite."

One Senate aid, emerging bug-eyed from the hearing room, grimly told the author: "The number of security risks whom Otepka turned down—only to have them 'cleared' by the top brass of the State Department—is greater than anyone in the Nation has realized."

It has been made public that Otepka declared the State Department to be riddled with men of questionable security backgrounds, many of them in the high echelons of the Department.

It is known that Otepka named Walt "The-Soviets-Are-Mellowing" Rostow (who sets all policy for the State Department and has set the pattern for the whole "Soviets-are-mellowing" policy throughout the administration); Harlan Cleveland; and William Wieland as being among the men whose backgrounds he considered "questionable."

Then the Senators called to these secret hearings several State Department officials to testify about the same cases which Otepka had discussed. These officials swore that the facts were absolutely opposite to what Otepka had described, and furthermore, they said, Otepka had never even brought these questionable cases to their attention.

The Senators recalled Otepka and ordered him, under oath, to document his previous testimony about the questionable security cases.

Otepka produced State Department memorandums and papers from State Department files, in what one Senator described as "iron-clad documentation" of every word Otepka had previously uttered about the security cases involved, and in documented refutation of what the State Department officials had sworn about these same cases.

Furthermore, Otepka also proved that the State officials had lied under oath when they testified that they knew nothing about the cases and that Otepka had never brought the cases to their attention. Otepka produced papers about the cases, initialed and noted in reply to Otepka's bringing the cases to their attention—by the very same State Department officials who had sworn they knew nothing about them.

The personal cost to himself of Otepka's testimony can never be fully realized by the American public. After he gave his first testimony, and word of it reached the White House, Otepka was given the full treatment with ruthless efficiency, reportedly at the personal order of Bobby Kennedy.

On June 27, 1963, Otepka was called into the office of John J. Reilly, State's chief security officer, and a personal friend of Bobby Kennedy. Reilly told Otepka that his duties were being taken away from him. His new assignment was to update a handbook on security. As the two men walked back to Otepka's office, six security officers joined them, entered Otepka's office, seized all his records, the contents of his 14 safes, and started making arrangements to change the combinations. Otepka went out to keep a luncheon appointment, and when he returned, he found that he was barred from his office and given a cubbyhole in which to update his handbook. His secretary was taken away from him and he was to be allowed secretarial help only with the permission of Reilly.

His cubbyhole was "bugged;" his telephone was tapped and then taken away from him; the trash from his wastebasket and "burn bag" was collected and searched surreptitiously by Reilly, who had the little burn bag (which is used to destroy classified waste material) marked with a red X and brought to the State Department mailroom, where he sneaked it into his briefcase. Junior G-man Reilly then laboriously pasted together scraps of Otepka's torn papers, peered at reams of wornout typewriter ribbons, and devoted hours of the taxpayers' time and money to "git" Otepka. Otepka faced Reilly and asked him for an explanation of the whole thing, but Reilly refused to explain. Finally Bobby Kennedy dispatched FBI investigators to interrogate Otepka for hours on end.

But bravely Otepka struggled on. He refused to resign. He forced the security risks to fire the security officer.

The Senate subcommittee hearings were getting so hot, that Secretary of State Dean Rusk conferred personally and privately with President Kennedy about strategy in the matter of purging the patriot who had struggled to keep security risks out of the State Department. The decision was reached. On August 15, Abba Schwartz, the State Department's Administrator of Security—a political appointee who has had some experience in immigration cases, but who does not have a single day's training in security procedures or regulations—issued an order forbidding State Department employees to appear before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, or to have anything to do with the Senate subcommittee personnel. Reilly also gave the same order to his own personnel. The move was lashed in Congress as "an outrageous interference with the right of Congress

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to investigate, and an interference with the right of free speech."

On September 23, 1963, as soon as the Senate was sewed up to approve the testban treaty, the State Department held charges of "misconduct" against Otepka for allegedly improperly turning over State Department documents to J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Otepka was given 10 days to answer the charges, procured a 10-day extension, and was scheduled to be suspended without pay. Since the State Department could not charge Otepka with falsifying testimony before the Senate subcommittee—because he himself had refuted the perjured testimony of State Department officials—they charged him with "misconduct" in giving documents to Sourwine.

The fact is, however, that Otto Otepka had responded to the subpoena of a duly constituted subcommittee of the U.S. Senate to substantiate charges he had made against alleged security risks in the State Department—in answering Senators' specific questions—by producing documented evidence carrying names and initials of the selfsame State Department officials who had sworn they had never laid eyes on the documents. Otepka's act of refuting, chapter and verse, with documented evidence—under subpoena of a Senate subcommittee—the perjury of the New Frontiersmen about security cases was alleged by the New Frontiersmen to be a violation of security.

The State Department, caught dead to rights in the act of lying to a Senate subcommittee, based its flimsy charges against Otepka on the basis that he violated a 1948 Executive order issued by Harry Truman—to bar congressional probes into the case of convicted Communist William Remington and into the Alger Hiss case—which says that files on Government employees are not to be given to Members of Congress, except through the President.

However, that same year, 1948, Congress passed a law, title V, section 52 of the United States Code, which reads:

"The rights of persons employed in the civil service of the United States \*\*\* to furnish information to either House of Congress or to any committee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with."

Furthermore, in 1958 a concurrent resolution was passed by both Houses of Congress which reads:

"Any person in Government service should put loyalty to highest moral principles and country above loyalty to persons, party or Government department."

Otepka cited the United States Code statute in his October 14 rebuttal of the charges against him, and furthermore he denied that he had ever furnished classified documents or other restricted information to any unauthorized person. Moreover, Otepka cited a Senate report as proof that Dean Rusk himself had shown classified loyalty documents to a Senator.

In the meantime, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, enraged by the total lack of cooperation and the gag order of the State Department, had been trying since early July to get Dean Rusk to testify about the case in secret session. Rusk had first pleaded that he was too busy about negotiations with Russia; then the Senators forced him into making several appointments to testify, all of which he broke. Finally, on October 2, the entire bipartisan Senate Judiciary Committee took the unprecedented step of dispatching a U.S. Senator to deliver a document by hand—a 10-page bill of particulars and statement of charges to Dean Rusk, who was having secret conferences in New York with Soviet officials. The committee dispatched Senator THOMAS J. DODD, vice chairman of its Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, with the document and a covering letter signed by Senator

JAMES O. EASTLAND, chairman of the committee.

The sizzling document charged the State Department with covering up laxity in State Department security operations; it charged perjury by the State Department official who had testified in opposition to Otepka's documented evidence; and it demanded that Dean Rusk produce witnesses, including himself, to testify about the questionable security procedures and cases in the State Department.

At a press conference, President Kennedy was questioned by a reporter about the State Department gag order, about the whole Otepka scandal in which Otepka had named William Arthur Wieland, Walter W. Rostow, and many others. Kennedy completely evaded answering the questions about Rostow and Wieland and many others, and simply said that Rusk would appear before the Senators and clear up all those little difficulties.

The Senators finally got Rusk into the testimony chair and grilled him for hours in secret session. Unless Rusk performed some magicians' tricks, he must have had some pretty uncomfortable hours trying to answer the Senators' charges. At this writing Rusk's testimony has not been released, but not a few Americans are looking forward with interest to seeing it.

On October 3, the St. Louis Globe-Democrat revealed that it was beginning to appear that there is even more behind the effort to oust Otto Otepka "than was first suspected":

"Suspicion is strong in Washington that the plot against him goes even beyond the State Department—that the character moving in on Otepka is a more powerful figure in our Government than the Secretary of State—none other than the President's brother, Attorney General Bobby Kennedy.

"What's it all about?

"It's more because Mr. Otepka is a career man in Government service of unquestioned loyalty who thinks Congress is entitled to know what's going on, who wants real security measures carried out. In other words, Mr. Otepka has been a hard-line, anti-Communist State Department official—just like Miss Frances Knight, Director of the Passport Office, who has been in constant hot water with her superiors for the same reason.

"With Bobby Kennedy trying to move in Kennedy people to run things the administration way, Mr. Otepka drew the line at some characters he considered dubious.

"The flimsy charges about what he told the subcommittee are reported incidental to getting rid of the State Department security official who guarded the door."

Not incidentally, the three-ring-circus Valachi hearings were stage-managed by Bobby Kennedy at precisely the same time as the Otepka case broke into October's headlines. The Otepka case, of course, is of enormous significance to the future well-being of our national security; whereas, according to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover (and as corroborated by Hoover's opposite number in the Canadian Government), every word uttered by Valachi has been known for years by U.S. law enforcement officers. Many observers asserted flatly that staging the Valachi hearings at that precise moment was an attempt by the Kennedy administration to distract public attention from the security risks scattered throughout the Kennedy administration—as then being enunciated by Otto Otepka.

On November 5, Otepka received his dismissal notice from the State Department. Senators immediately rose to Otepka's defense. Senator STROM THURMOND declared that Otepka was "railroaded with methods characteristic of a police state. Otepka should be reinstated, exonerated, and commended for his courage. The dismissal points to the pressing need for a full investigation of the State Department."

THURMOND denounced Otepka's dismissal as "a clear-cut case of retaliation against a Government witness for cooperating with a Senate committee." He declared that the State Department action is "an offense against the Congress," which may "constitute contempt of the Senate, which is punishable by imprisonment."

THURMOND declared that the "American public, newspapers, and private citizens have joined in demanding that the State Department, this bureaucratic nightmare, be cleaned out \*\*\* the State Department is in bad need of a purge."

The Senator further declared, "It now appears that a purge of personnel is being attempted. Unfortunately, it is the very opposite of what the critics of the State Department have in mind, for it is, in effect, an attempted purge of patriots. \*\*\* The State Department's attempted purge of patriots must not be tolerated, and this very attempt is further evidence that a thorough investigation of the State Department is in order."

The Charleston News and Courier pointed to the fact that the possibility of disloyalty in high echelons of the State Department is hardly to be written off: "In view of the fact that persons of proven disloyalty have held high posts in the State Department in years past, the subcommittee has a duty to dig deeply."

A sample of what one newspaper described as a case "which demonstrates honor as it now exists on the New Frontier" came to light in November. Three of the State Department officials whom the subcommittee had summoned to discuss Otepka's previous testimony and his whole case were: Elmer Hill, Chief of State's Technical Services Division; John Reilly, Otepka's boss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, who is a personal friend of Bobby Kennedy, placed over Otepka when the New Frontier made its debut, and the man who set up the bugging of Otepka's cubbyhole, the tapping of Otepka's telephone, and the months-long harassment of Otepka—all reportedly at the personal order of Bobby Kennedy; and David Bellisle, Reilly's special assistant.

The Senators asked the three men whether or not they knew anything at all about the bugging and telephone tapping. All three men swore under oath that they knew nothing about it. But in November, when the subcommittee's investigators informed the Senators that they had ironclad evidence that the bugging and tapping had been done, and that Hill and Reilly had actually set it up, Senator TOMAS DODD charged Hill and Reilly with perjury. Quick as a wink, all three men hastily dispatched letters of clarification to the subcommittee. Hill and Reilly admitted that they had not told the whole story under oath, and had, in fact, been the men who bugged and tapped Otepka's cubbyhole. On November 17, Reilly and Hill resigned from the State Department. Bellisle pleaded that he had no firsthand knowledge of the shenanigans, but admitted that he knew about them, and that he had been out of the country when they took place. At this writing, Bellisle is still ensconced in the State Department, and Bobby Kennedy has not yet given his friend Reilly a new job on the New Frontier.

At this writing, the Otepka affair bodes to be one of the bitterest clashes between the State Department and the Senate in American history, and M. STANTON EVANS, editor of the Indianapolis News, has written an excellent prognosis of the case:

"The episode as a whole presents a rather unhappy picture of operating procedure in Foggy Bottom. We have, in order:

1. State Department Official William Wieland covering up the true nature of Fidel Castro's 26 July Movement, helping steer the United States into diplomatic catastrophe in Cuba.

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"2. State Department higher-ups covering up for Wieland, overriding sensible security practices to do so.

"3. State Department denial of the true facts of the security situation, in order to cover up for their previous coverup of Wieland.

"4. State Department reprisals against a man courageous enough to tell the truth about security procedures, in order to cover up for their general coverup in the security picture as a whole.

"In an interview with Williard Edwards of the Chicago Tribune, Otepka commented concerning coverup No. 3: "This put their testimony in conflict with mine and with my official knowledge. Their testimony was untrue. Since they had used the subcommittee forum to make their statements, I felt entitled to rebut their statements and present the true facts. \* \* \* I'm charged with violation of orders when all I did was defend myself."

"Considering the Department's overall record in this field, it seems unlikely its campaign against Otepka is inspired by zeal for security. The Kennedy officials are obviously concerned to prevent Congress from knowing of their misdeances—merely the latest flowering of Executive arrogance toward the legislature. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee means to assert the rightful prerogatives of the lawmaking branch, and it is to be hoped the result will puncture the hubris of the foreign policy bureaucracy.

"There are yet other ramifications of the Otepka case, embracing Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland. According to testimony before the subcommittee, Cleveland has been bringing people of dubious security status into the State Department. Simultaneously, evidence has accumulated suggesting a sustained effort to dismantle the security office of the Department—a move described by former Security Chief John W. Hanes as either 'incompetence or a deliberate attempt to render the State Department's security section ineffective.' It was Otepka's difference with the New Frontier on these matters that allegedly brought on the vendetta against him. The subcommittee has also been examining this aspect of the controversy."

The lesson of the Otepka case is plain. The State Department security against penetration by Communists and against other security risks has been smashed and exists effectively no longer.

And the man most knowledgeable on the subject, the man who struggled hardest and the most bravely to keep security in the State Department, is a man hunted, then destroyed, by the security risks themselves.

Why? Because he did a good job, and because he answered the subpoena of a duly constituted committee of the Senate and told what is going on in the State Department, revealing that the men around the President use strange means to get their strange friends into the State Department over the violent objections of men like Otto Otepka.

Another man dethroned by the administration's effective smashing of security in the State Department is Elmer Hipsley, who had been in charge of worldwide physical security in State's Office of Security, as Otepka had been in charge of worldwide personnel security.

Hipsley had been responsible for the safe-keeping of such vital items as secret documents, secret codes, and safes in U.S. embassies around the world. He was responsible for the personal safety of the Secretary of State wherever the Secretary traveled; and for the protection of all foreign officials visiting the United States.

Hipsley, big, red-haired and a tough ex-policeman, was—like Otepka and others—

nonpolitical. In fact, he had entered State from the Secret Service. He is personally a quiet, though a fabulous, man. During the course of his work Hipsley has met the leaders of communism personally, and he understands and detests communism.

Hipsley was the Secret Service agent along with Franklin D. Roosevelt when he died in Warm Springs, Ga., in 1945. Hipsley stood behind F.D.R. at Yalta, and knows firsthand what transpired at that disastrous conference. Hipsley was with President Harry Truman at Potsdam, and is believed to have handed Truman the message of the first atomic bomb explosion at Hiroshima.

Hipsley is respected by international security men ranging from Scotland Yard to Moscow and the Sûreté. In his work he has known many of the world's Communist leaders, including Stalin—who did a good deal of talking with F.D.R. at both Yalta and Teheran.

Although every patriotic American detests Khrushchev and the Communist slave system, many Americans were genuinely concerned about the possibility of war or similar disaster should harm befall the Soviet boss when he made his first unprecedented visit to this Nation in September 1959, and covered 6,000 miles from east coast to west and back. Elmer Hipsley was in complete charge of Khrushchev's safety from the time his plane set down at Andrews Air Force Base until his departure and, as Americans will recall, Nikita arrived, saw Eisenhower, and departed without an incident.

Security arrangements for a trip of this kind take not only highly professional skill but also most detailed planning, involving split-second timing. The problem was complicated by the fact that we have no national police force in the European sense of the word. While Hipsley had the support of the Secret Service, FBI, CIA, and other Federal agencies, he was largely dependent upon his own arrangements with local police forces, whether Khrushchev was traveling slowly through crowded cities or eating lunch in the middle of an Iowa wheat field.

Khrushchev, receiving hostile treatment from American crowds and protesting pickets, tried to gain sympathy by making a play involving security. Khrushchev complained that he was not being permitted to go to Disneyland, on the outskirts of sprawling Los Angeles, although it was his own security chief, General Zaharov, who had made that decision. After that play fizzled, Khrushchev claimed our security was so tight that he was not able to meet Americans freely. As he traveled north toward San Francisco, photographs showed Khrushchev visiting with some children at the Santa Barbara station platform where his train stopped. The Washington Daily News (a Scripps-Howard paper) printed this picture and captioned it, "Khrushchev after the Relaxation of Security." In the photo, standing with his arms almost circling Khrushchev, was the omnipresent Hipsley. Incidentally, the crowd in San Francisco belied press reports by being as hostile as crowds elsewhere.

Elmer Hipsley's finest protective job, however, was in connection with Khrushchev's historic visit to New York, along with all the satellite stooges from Europe and even Cuba, for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly in 1961.

Few in Washington thought that so many Communist masters of mass murder and bloody oppression could escape from New York unscathed or without some incident. There was Nasser of Egypt in an area of strong Jewish concentration. There was a racial minority in New York (and a large one throughout the Nation) from every satellite nation which has been raped and sub-

jugated. There were, for example, Baltic and Polish peoples whose whole families had been executed or who were still in slave-labor camps. With luck, it was said in Washington, Red leaders might leave the United States alive, but without incident? Impossible.

"New York's finest"—her police force—received well-deserved credit for the fact that nothing happened. (Actually, so many New York police were assigned to guard Khrushchev on his first visit to New York that the city later sent a bill to the U.N. for \$1 million in an attempt to recoup for the taxpayers' money they had expended. The U.N. never paid. By statute, the State Department—and that meant Elmer Hipsley—was in charge of the safety of all these visitors when they were away from the U.N. building itself.

In a control room in the Waldorf-Astoria, although it was never revealed, sat Hipsley with a top New York police official. An around-the-clock agent was assigned to every foreign visitor. When one of the visitors prepared to leave his quarters or office for another location, Hipsley's agent reported. So close was the coordination that sometimes the New York police officer and sometimes Hipsley himself cut in on the radio bands and set up police protection along the route of travel. When Castro, taking an incident, moved from midtown to a Harlem hotel, it was Hipsley who accompanied him on his midnight shift. When it was all over, and Khrushchev left, one of his last acts was to give Hipsley grudging thanks for his protection.

As for Castro, Hipsley had protected him on his first trip to the United States, too. When Fidel's security guards fell asleep, Castro slipped out onto the women-laden Washington streets to try his luck. It was Hipsley who saw to it that police cars discreetly trailed him—something unknown to the Cuban dictator to this day.

To Hipsley flowed police and other security agency reports of all kinds, including those about would-be killers moving in from Miami to get Castro, or of a man slipping in from Mexico to kill Khrushchev. And Hipsley's orders were to prevent that man from getting to his target—to take him "out of play." In addition, so-called "nut" reports run into thousands during such visits, since the mentally disturbed often react violently to certain visitors receiving top billing in the news. It has been Hipsley's job to separate the nut reports from genuine threats when the cards are down—a business he has spent a lifetime learning.

Some might ask, "Why stop assassins from killing Castro, or Khrushchev, or other world Communist leaders?" There is probably no one who knows and detests communism more than does Elmer Hipsley. But he is a "pro" at his job—and the United States cannot afford the game of having its official guests either assassinated or molested.

For a professional job well done, one might expect a decoration of Hipsley. No. He was given a pink slip, too, just like Otepka's. Then, when the fear of investigation and consequences developed, the group at State headed by J. Clayton Miller, the IPR man whom President Kennedy publicly "cleared" at Dean Rusk's request, officially minus Wieland, naturally, since Wieland was not officially involved—even though he sat in the same office—put through the reorganization plans for the Office of Security. Hipsley was taken from a worldwide anti-Communist operation to a small domestic operation with 20 men under him. Later he was sent to Switzerland, no less, as security officer. This was a long, long way from effective control of anything resembling worldwide physical security for the State Department.